We investigate the sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium of constrained network aggregative games to changes in exogenous parameters affecting the cost function of the players. This setting is motivated by two applications. The first is the analysis of interventions by a social planner with a networked objective function while the second is network routing games with atomic players and information constraints.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network aggregative games (NAGs) are used to model a vast range of applications [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] . In many cases, the resulting models depend on a vector of parameters that might represent either some exogenous factor in the case of social applications (e.g. rumors in opinion dynamics or shocks in financial networks) or a tuning variable in the case of technological applications (e.g. road improvements in traffic networks or the price elasticity in energy markets). In both cases, to fully understand and possibly control the behaviour of the system it is important to study the effect that variations of such parameters have on the final outcome of the game. As a first step, we here focus on the sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium to changes in the cost functions.
Our first main contribution is the derivation of a general sensitivity result for the Nash equilibrium of games with constraints. To this end, we use an implicit function type of argument to get a sensitivity result for the KKT system of the variational inequality associated with the game, as in [7] . We then to do a primal reformulation to get a sensitivity result that involves only the decision variables (i.e., the players strategies) and not the dual variables. This reformulation allows us to derive insights for two classes of NAGs.
The first class of NAGs that we consider is that of quadratic network games [8] . Here we assume that for each agent i there is a parameter y i that represents a small stochastic perturbation or shock to the cost function of agent i. Without interventions, these shocks would drive the system from the unperturbed Nash equilibrium x (0) to the new Nash configuration x (y). We first show that the sensitivity results in [2] can be found as a corollary of our main result. We then consider a controlled setting in which a central authority can intervene on the system and guarantee that the strategy of one agent k in the new equilibrium is the same as in the case without shocks (by imposing the constraint x k (y) = x k (0)). We use our main result to characterize which agent should be selected by the F. Parise central authority to minimize the effect of the shocks on the whole system. As a corollary, if the adjacency matrix of the network is non-negative, one can recover the key-player result derived in [9] for linear-quadratic network games. In [10] we apply our result to study rumor spreading in opinion dynamics. Other areas of application are financial networks [2] or crime, education and urban dynamics [8] , [9] .
The second class of NAGs that we consider is that of atomic routing games [3] . Therein each player is a user that needs to optimally allocate a fixed amount of splittable flow between a given origin-destination pair to reduce travel time, in the presence of congestion effects. We assume that for each road e there is a parameter y e modelling the effort made by a central authority to reduce the travel time on that road. Our objective is to characterise which road should the central authority improve to optimize the system performance (i.e. to reduce the total travel time). Besides the natural network flow constraints, we additionally use constraints to model the fact that the users might have different sets of information on the network, as motivated in [11] . For example different agents may know different subsets of roads. We note that the standard sensitivity results derived in [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] do not apply in our setting because, on the one hand, we consider agents with information constraints and, on the other hand, we consider atomic agents (i.e., we focus on the Nash equilibrium instead of the Wardrop equilibrium).
Our results have strong connections with comparative statics results derived in economics. These works have however focused mainly on games with specific ordering properties (e.g., games with strategic complements/substitutes [16] , [17] ) or games where the aggregate of the strategies is a scalar quantity (e.g., scalar aggregative games [18] , [19] , [20] ). The main difference of our work is that we consider explicitly the effect of the constraints.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce NAGs and our main result on sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium in constrained games. In Section III and IV we show how this result can be applied to quadratic network games and atomic routing games, respectively.
Notation: We denote the Jacobian of f (x) :
] denotes the set of integer numbers in the interval [a, b]. 1 n is the vector of unit entries and e i the ith canonical vector. Given A ∈ R n×n , A 0 ( 0) ⇔ x Ax > 0 (≥ 0), ∀x = 0, A (k,:) denotes the kth row of A. A⊗B denotes the Kronecker product. Given N matrices
|E| denotes the cardinality of the set E.
II. NETWORK AGGREGATIVE GAMES

A. The model
We consider a game with N players that are interacting over a network with non-negative adjacency matrix P . We assume P ii = 0 for all i ∈ N [1, N] . We say that j is a neighboor of i if P ij > 0. The set of neighbours of player i is denoted by N i . Each player i ∈ N[1, N] aims at selecting a vector strategy x i ∈ R n among its feasible set X i ⊆ R n to minimize a cost function
which depends on its own strategy x i , on the linear combination of the neighbours strategies according to the coefficients of the network
For each admissible parameter vector y ∈ Y we refer to the game with N players and cost functions as in (1) as the network aggregative game (NAG) with parameter y and we denote it by G(y). We assume that for each y ∈ Y, the game G(y) satisfies the following regularity conditions. Assumption 1 (Constraints): The constraint sets can be expressed as
In the following, we define x := [x i ] N i=1 ∈ R Nn the vector whose i-th block component is the strategy of agent i. We also define m :
is twice continuously differentiable and strongly convex in x i for all i ∈ N[1, N] and for all
In the rest of the paper we are going to study properties of the Nash equilibrium of the game G(y), as defined next.
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium): A set of strategies
B. Connection between game theory and variational inequalities
We start by recalling an equivalent characterization of the Nash equilibrium of a generic game (i.e. not necessarily a NAG) in terms of variational inequalities.
Definition 2 (Variational inequality): A vectorx ∈ R n solves the variational inequality VI(X , f) with set X ⊆ R n and operator f (x) : X → R n if and only if
To this end, we define the operator F (x, y) : X × Y → R Nn whose i-th block component is the gradient of the cost function of agent i with respect to its own strategy in G(y)
This operator is of fundamental importance in the subsequent analysis because of the following well known relation, see e.g. [21, Eq (18) ], [22, Proposition 1.3.4 and 3.2.1]. Proposition 1 (VI and KKT system): Under Assumptions 1 and 2 the following statements are equivalent 1) x (y) is a Nash equilibrium for the game G(y);
2) x (y) solves the VI(X , F (·, y));
(3c) In the following, we focus on games for which the operator F (x, y) is strongly monotone according to the following definition. We derive sufficient conditions for strong monotonicity to hold in the case of NAGs in [10, Section III].
C. Main sensitivity analysis result for constrained games
We here present our main sensitivity analysis result which holds for any game (i.e. not necessarily a NAG) with constraints satisfying the following assumption.
Assumption 4 (Constraint qualification): Given a parameterȳ ∈ Y and the corresponding Nash equilibrium x (ȳ) let B 0 , b 0 be the matrices obtained by deleting from B, b all the rows corresponding to constraints that are not active at
; H] and a := [b 0 , h]. We assume that: 1) A has full row rank; 2) the strict complementarity slackness condition λ k (ȳ) > 0 when B (k,:) x (ȳ) = b k is satisfied. 1 Assumption 4 may be difficult to verify in general. However, it is automatically satisfied if only equality constraints are present and, for the case of non-negativity constraints, if all the inactive agents at the equilibrium could reduce their cost by picking a negative strategy.
Theorem 1: Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are satisfied. Then for all y ∈ Y the game G(y) admits a unique Nash equilibrium x (y). If additionally Assumption 4 holds forȳ ∈ Y then x (y) is locally differentiable atȳ and
where
and A is as defined in Assumption 4. Moreover, M 0. We report the proof of this theorem in [10, Theorem 1].
III. QUADRATIC NETWORK GAMES
A. The setting
Consider the specific class of NAGs with cost functions ). For such class of games, the parameter y i ∈ Y i ⊆ R n usually represents a localized shock or perturbation to the payoff of agent i. In the following, we assume that these shocks y i are small, i.i.d. and have meanŷ. If the strategy of the agents are unconstrained (i.e. X i = R n ) and P ii = 0 for all i ∈ [1, N] then each agent's best response can be characterized explicitly as
. By using this reformulation, the recent work [2] conducted sensitivity analysis of the Nash equilibrium and studied volatility of aggregates to shocks (perturbations) in unconstrained quadratic games. We briefly recap such results in Section III-B and show that they can be recovered as a special case of our main formula (4).
In Section III-C we exploit formula (4) to extend the results of [2] to the constrained case. In this setting, constraints emerge, for example, when a central authority has an objective function that depends on the exact structure of the network (such as minimizing the difference between the actions of a subset of agents over part of the network or keeping the actions or beliefs of certain agents unchanged). As in [2] , we model the aggregate output of the system as
where h : R n → R n and g : R n → R. Note that, in the absence of shocks the Nash equilibrium is x (0) with associated output s(0). Suppose now that the central authority can intervene and guarantee that, no matter what the realization of the shocks, one agent does not change its strategy. This intervention can be modeled by adding the constraint x k = x k (0) to the game. Note that this constraint does not modify the unperturbed system output, but modifies how the system reacts to shocks. Our objective is to address the following question: Which agent should be constrained to minimize the effect of the shocks on the new system output s(y)? By exploiting formula (4) we provide an answer to this question both from an ex-post perspective (i.e., if the central authority knows the actual realization y of the shock) and from an ex-ante perspective (i.e., if the authority must commit to his decision before the shock is realized).
In the following we focus our discussion on the scalar case, formula (4) however allows an immediate generalization of our results to the multidimentional case. We also assume the following regularity conditions and normalizations.
Assumption 5: (Network games) The adjacency matrix P of the network is non-negative and, for each i ∈ N[1, N], P ii = 0. Moreover, f (0) = g(0) = h(0) = 0. For each w ∈ R, 0 ≤ f (w) ≤ γ and γ P < 1. Note that the previous assumption implies that, in the absence of shocks, the equilibrium state x (0) and the output of the system s(0) are both zero. Moreover, Theorem 2 in [10] guarantees that under Assumption 5, Assumption 3 is satisfied.
B. The unconstrained case
In [2] the following formula for the Nash sensitivity in unconstrained quadratic network games is derived
so that ∂x j (0)
The matrix L := [I − f (0)P ] −1 is known in the economic literature as Leontief matrix. It follows from Assumption 5 that L is well defined (i.e. the inverse exists). By using Neumann series it is also easy to see that
Consequently, the element L ji is the sum over all the possible paths from i to j of the product of the edge weights in the path discounted by the factor f (0) l , where l is the path length. Intuitively the element L ji describes the ways in which a shock applied to agent i propagates to agent j. It is then immediate to see that L has nonnegative entries and that L ii ≥ 1 (take l = 0).
The output sensitivity to a shock to agent i given in [2] is
where α := f (0)g (0)h (0). It is evident from (9) that whether a positive shock y i to agent i locally increases or decreases the output depends only on the sign of α or in other words on the convexity/concavity pattern of the functions g, h at the origin [2] . The strength of such effect, on the other hand, depends on the parameter v i := N m=1 L mi , which is the Bonacich centrality of agent i. Definition 4 (Bonacich centrality): The element v i := N m=1 L mi , obtained by summing the entries of the Leontief matrix in column i, is the Bonacich centrality of agent i.
Note that v i is always positive and corresponds to the weighted sum of the paths through which the shock can propagate from agent i to any other agent in the network.
C. The constrained case
Theorem 1 allow us to generalize formula (7) to the constrained case. Specifically, under Assumptions 1 to 4
where L is the same Leontief matrix of equation (7). Similarly, the output sensitivity becomes ∂s(0)
We then see that the unconstrained case (i.e. when the A matrix is empty) is just a special case of (10) and (11) .
We next consider the case when the central authority adds the specific constraint x k = x k (0) = 0, as motivated above. Since this is an equality constraint Assumption 4 is always met and A = e k . If agent k is constrained, a shock to an arbitrary agent i affects an agent j according to
Note that the terms L ji and L jk L ki L kk have always the same sign, therefore fixing the strategy of an agent has the effect of reducing the sensitivity to the shock for the others. The relevance of such effect depends on the weight of the paths from i to k and from k to j, normalized by the weight of the loops passing through k. The output sensitivity becomes
In [23] it is proven that, since L is a Leontief matrix and L kk ≥ 1,
By summing over all m ∈ N[1, N] we obtain that v i ≥ v i k . Therefore constraining agent k attenuates the sensitivity of the output but can never reverse its sign, which again depends only on the sign of α.
By using (12) we can approximate the ex-post output, given that agent k was constrained, as
In the following we assume that α > 0 and shocks are non-negative y i ≥ 0. Similar results can be derived for the other cases. Under these assumptions, s(y | k) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ N[1, N] . Since s(0) = 0, to minimize the effect of the shocks the central authority should constrain agent
Note that, to use this formula, the central authority needs to know the realization y of the shock. If, on the other hand, the central authority needs to commit to a decision ex-ante then it should minimize the expected outcome N] , and thus constrain the opinion of agent
is, the agent with maximum inter-centrality, as defined next, and not the one with maximum Bonacich centrality, contrary to what one could have expected.
Definition 5 (Inter-centrality [9] ): The quantity (13) where L is the Leontief matrix, is the inter-centrality or keyplayer centrality of agent k. The example given in Figure 1 provides intuition for the difference between Bonacich and inter-centrality. Therein we consider, for different values of f (0), a directed network without loops where all the edges have the same weight. Note that in the absence of loops L ii = 1 for all i, hence Recall that L mi is the total weight of paths from node i to node m, discounted by f (0) l , where l is the path length. A first thing to note is that the Bonacich centrality v i only depends on out-going paths, while the inter-centrality w i depends on the product of both in-coming and out-going paths. Constraining an agent has two effects. The first direct effect is that the strategy of the agent influences all its followers, the second indirect effect is that it blocks all the shocks coming from previous nodes and prevents then from spreading further over the network. It is then clear that the relevance of an agent as an influencer (direct effect) depends on its out-going paths, but its relevance as a blocker (indirect effect) depends on the in-coming paths. One should then aim at constraining an agent for which both effects are relevant. A second thing to note is that how strong these effects are depends on how strong the interaction is among the agents (i.e. how large f (0) is). From the interpretation of f (0) as a discount factor in L mi we see that, when f (0) is very small, only short paths are important. In the limit, for very small f (0), the Bonacich centrality of an agent i is its outdegree, while the inter-centrality is the product between outand in-degree (both plus one to account for L ii = 1). It is then clear why in Figure 1 , for the case f (0) = 0.1, the agent with maximum Bonacich centrality is the one on the right (with out-degree 6) while there are two agents with same maximum inter-centrality (with product of out-and -in degree equals to 1·6). On the other hand, the higher f (0) is, the more paths of higher length matters. This explains why for f (0) = 1 the agents with highest Bonacich centrality are the ones on the extreme left from which more paths are departing. Extreme agents can never have high intercentrality because they always have either very low in-path or out-path weight.
Formula (11) can be used to perform the same analysis for any arbitrary number K > 1 of constrained agents, by setting A = [e kj ] K j=1 . We apply these results to rumour propagation in opinion dynamics in [10, Section IV.D].
IV. ATOMIC ROUTING GAMES WITH INFORMATION CONSTRAINTS
A. The setting
Consider a directed graph (V, E) where each node v ∈ V corresponds to a location and each directed edge e = (u, v) ∈ E corresponds to a road connecting u to v = u. We define H to be the node-edge incidence matrix of the road network. Equivalently, given any edge e = (u, v) ∈ E, H k,e = −1 if k = u, H k,e = 1 if k = v and H k,e = 0 otherwise. We assume that each agent i ∈ N[1, N] has a non-negligible (atomic [3] ) amount of flow η i > 0 that he needs to assign to the available routes between an origin node o i ∈ V and a destination node d i ∈ V. Differently from standard routing games, we assume that agent i knows only a subset E i ⊆ E of the roads, which may be different for each agent.
Let x i ∈ R |E| be a vector whose component x i e denotes the flow that agent i is allocating on road e. A flow x i is feasible for agent i if 1) x i ≥ 0; 2) Hx i = h i , where h i is a vector whose entries are all 0 except for the origin node o i that has entry −η i and the destination node d i that has entry η i ; 3) x i e = 0 for all e / ∈ E i . Note that conditions 1) and 2) are the feasibility conditions of the standard routing game, while condition 3) models the fact that the agents might have different sets of information.
Set
x j be the vector of total edge flows. To model congestion effects we assume that the travel time for each edge is a function p e (z e , y e ) : R ≥0 × R >0 → R >0 of the total edge flow z e which might depend on a parameter y e (i.e., number of lanes, speed limits, etc.). The travel time experienced by agent i is therefore
Note that in this application both the aggregate z(x) and the parameter y := [y e ] |E| e=1 are the same for every agent. Since z(x) depends on the sum of the flow vectors of all the agents this is a NAG with a matrix P whose elements are all equal to one (not to be confused with the road network which appears in the constraints via the incidence matrix H). Our objective is to study the effect of the parameter y on the total travel time s(y) = |E| e=1 p e (z e (x (y)), y e )z e (x (y)) =: p(z(x (y)), y) z(x (y)) 
where z e (y) := N j=1 x j e (y) is the total edge flow and
is the set of feasible edge flow allocations for agent i.
B. Sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium in routing games
From here on, we assume that the routing game operator,
satisfies the following regularity condition. Assumption 6 (Travel time functions): Suppose that F (x, y) in (17) satisfies Assumption 2 and 3.
Remark 1: Conditions on the travel time functions p e (·, y e ) such that Assumption 6 is satisfied have been discussed for example in [24] . As a special case we note that, Assumption 6 is always met in the case of affine and strictly increasing travel time functions. We also note that Assumption 1 is always satisfied in routing games.
Under Assumption 6, Theorem 1 guarantees the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium for the atomic routing game. To compute its sensitivity we need to check Assumption 4 at the current parameterȳ. In the traffic context, this condition ensures that, if an agent i is not using road e for the parameter y (i.e, x i e (ȳ) = 0), then for small perturbations of the parameter it won't use road e also in the new equilibrium x i (y). In other words, the subset of the constraints {x i e ≥ 0} |E| e=1 that are active should be locally unchanged. 2 If we consider a parameterȳ such that this assumption is met, then Theorem 1 allows us to compute the Nash sensitivity
where F (x, y) is as in (17) and M, L are as defined in (5) . Note that, given x (ȳ), the matrix A of active constraints used in (5) has the following structure that are active at x i (ȳ). From (18) one can then derive the sensitivity of the total edge flow at the Nash equilibrium, (19) and the sensitivity of the total travel time s(y) in (15) can be computed from the sensitivity of the total edge flow as
where we omitted the dependence of z (ȳ) onȳ for simplicity. Formula (20) can be used to understand which road improvements lead, at least locally, to a higher improvement of travel time for the whole network. In fact s(y) ≈ s(ȳ) + |E| e=1 ∂s(ȳ) ∂y e (y e −ȳ e ). If we assume that a road improvement on road e corresponds to a decrease of the parameter y e , then (y e −ȳ e ) < 0 and the road that should be improved to minimize s(y) isê := arg max e∈E ∂s(ȳ) ∂y e . It might happen that ∂s(ȳ) ∂y e < 0 for some road e ∈ E. In this case an improvement on road e actually leads to an increase of total travel time. This pathological situation is known as Braess' paradox. Formula (20) can then be used to check whether for a specific network the Braess' paradox occurs.
C. Simulation
Consider the Wheatstone 5 roads network illustrated at the top of Figure 2 with congestion functions p i (z i ) = 40 150 z i for i ∈ {1, 3}, p i (z i ) = 1 150 z i +45 for i ∈ {2, 4} and p 5 (z 5 , y) = y 150 z 5 , where y > 0 is a parameter affecting the travel time on road 5. One can easily verify that Assumption 6 is satisfied for every y > 0. We consider a game with N = 12 agents and we assume that each agent i has flow η i = 12.5 and wants to go from node 1 to 4. Moreover, we assume that only a fraction q ∈ [0, 1] of the agents knows edge 5 (i.e., E i := E for i ∈ [1, qN ] ), while the remaining agents don't (i.e., E i := {1, 2, 3, 4} for i ∈ [ qN + 1, N] ). The middle plot in Figure 2 shows the total travel time s(y) at the Nash equilibrium as a function of the parameter y, for q ∈ {1, 2/3, 1/3, 0}. The plot at the bottom shows the sensitivity of s(y) computed according to (20) . The Braess' paradox is captured by the fact that for q = 1 ∂s(y) ∂y is negative, that is, augmenting the cost of edge 5 decreases the total travel time. The informational Braess' paradox [11] , that is, the fact that reducing the information given to the agents (i.e. decreasing q) actually decreases the total travel time, is also apparent, with the limit result that if no agent knew edge 5 (i.e. q = 0) then they would all be better off.
V. CONCLUSION
By using a formula for the Nash sensitivity in terms of primal variables only, we extended previous sensitivity results to small changes in the cost functions for quadratic network games and atomic routing games. As future direction we aim at investigating the effect of macroscopic variations of other game primitives, as the network topology.
